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Abstract
We show how the timing of ﬁnancial innovation might have contributed to
the mortgage boom and then to the bust of 2007-2009. We study the eﬀect of
leverage, tranching, securitization and CDS on asset prices in a general equilibrium model with collateral. We show why tranching and leverage tend to
raise asset prices and why CDS tend to lower them. This may seem puzzling,
since it implies that creating a derivative tranche in the securitization whose
payoﬀs are identical to the CDS will raise the underlying asset price while
the CDS outside the securitization lowers it. The resolution of the puzzle is
that the CDS lowers the value of the underlying asset since it is equivalent to
tranching cash.
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Introduction

In this paper we propose the possibility that the mortgage boom and bust crisis
of 2007-2009 might have been caused by ﬁnancial innovation. We suggest that the
astounding rise in subprime and Alt A leverage from 2000 to 2006, together with the
remarkable growth in securitization and tranching throughout the 1990s and early
2000s, raised the prices of the underlying assets like houses and mortgage bonds. We
further raise the possibility that the introduction of Credit Default Swaps, CDS, in
2005 and 2006 brought those prices crashing down with just the tiniest spark.
Securitization and tranching did not happen over night. The securitization of
mortgages by the government agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began in earnest
in the 1970s, when the ﬁrst pools of mortgages were assembled and shares were sold
to investors. In 1986 Salomon and First Boston created the ﬁrst tranches, buying
Fannie and Freddie Pools and cutting them into four pieces. This was no simple
task, because it involved not only special tax treatment by the government, but also
the creation of special legal entities and trusts which would collect the homeowner
payments and then divide them up among the bondholders. By the middle 1990s
the greatest mortgage powerhouse was the investment bank Kidder Peabody, cutting
hundreds of billions of dollars worth of mortgage pools into over 90 types of tranches
called CMOs (collateralized mortgage obligations). These tranches bore esoteric
names like ﬂoater, inverse ﬂoater, IO, PO, inverse IO, Pac, Tac, etc. The young
traders, often in their mid 20s, who collectively engineered this multi-trillion dollar
operation were motivated by the proﬁts they could make buying pools of mortgages
and cutting them up into more valuable tranches. They would ﬁnd out the needs
of various buyers and tailor make the tranches to deliver money in just those states
of nature that the buyers wanted them. In short, they exploited the heterogeneous
needs of their buyers by creating heterogeneous pieces out of a homogeneous pie.
The impetus driving the tranching machine was not a demand for riskless assets;
on the contrary, it was a demand for contingent assets. The Fannie and Freddie
principal mortgage payments were guaranteed against homeowner default by Fannie
and Freddie, enabling the tranches to be rated AAA. But that hardly meant they
were riskless. Changes in interest rates or changes in prepayments by the underlying
homeowners could radically alter the cash ﬂows of the tranches. Gradually Wall
Street came to see that default risk was just one among many risks, and pools and
tranching began to be undertaken without government guarantees, for example for
2

jumbo mortgages that were not eligible for purchase by Fannie and Freddie and for
credit cards and other assets.
Spurred on by these private securitizations, Wall Street dreamt up the idea in
the mid 1990s of pooling and tranching subprime mortgages, with no government
guarantees at all. Through a cleverly constructed architecture of pooling, senior
pieces were still able to get AAA bond ratings because they were protected by junior
tranches that absorbed the losses in case of homeowner defaults. The subprime
mortgage market grew from a few million dollars to a trillion by 2006.
In the 1990s credit default swaps were invented for corporate bonds and sovereign
bonds. It was not until 2005, however, that credit default swaps were standardized
for mortgages. A CDS is a kind of insurance on an asset or bond. It is the promise
to take back the underlying asset at par once there is a default, that is, to make up
the losses of the underlying asset.
Our approach, like many papers in economics that take technological innovation
as exogenous, is to take the ﬁnancial innovations in the mortgage market between
1986 and 2010 as exogenous and investigate their consequences for asset pricing.
Under this view, the tranching of subprime mortgages couldn’t have begun earlier,
because it had to wait for the innovation of CMO tranching. In later work we hope
to explain why the innovations came when they did and why for example CDS seem
to appear in various markets only after the risk of default is generally recognized to
be signiﬁcant.
The size of these ﬁnancial innovations is certainly staggering, and leaves one
wondering what their eﬀects might have been. Consider ﬁrst the history of subprime and Alt A leverage and housing prices from 2000-2008 shown in Figure 1,
taken from Geanakoplos (2010b). Leverage went from about 7 in 2000 (14% average
downpayment for the top half of households) to about 35 in the second quarter of
2006 (2.7% downpayment on average for the top half of households). Next consider
the growth of securitization and tranching presented in Figure 2, especially in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. These amounted to trillions of dollars a year. Finally,
consider the growth of the CDS market presented in Figure 3, especially after 2005.
The available numbers are not speciﬁc to mortgages, since most of these were over
the counter, but the fact that subprime CDS were not standardized until late 2005
suggests that the growth of mortgage CDS in 2006 is likely even sharper than Figure

3

Figure 1: Housing Leverage.
3 suggests. What is clear is that the explosive growth of the CDS market came after
the explosive growth of securitization.
Many people who are aware of these numbers have linked securitization and CDS
to the crisis of 2007-2009. While we agree with much of their view, our analysis is
based on entirely diﬀerent considerations. And we wish to explain the boom as well
as the bust.
Some problems that many critics have noted with tranching are i) the standing
opportunity for the original lender to sell his loans into a securitization destroys
his incentive to choose good loans and ii) once a pool is tranched it becomes very
diﬃcult for the bond holders to negotiate with each other (for example to write down
principal).
Many observers have pointed to the creation of CDS as the source of many problems, to mention a few: i) important ﬁnancial institutions wrote trillions of dollars of
CDS insurance; the economy could not run smoothly after they lost so much money
on their bad bets, ii) writers of CDS insurance did not even post enough collateral to
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Figure 2: Securitization/Tranching.
cover their bets, forcing the government to bail out the beneﬁciaries, iii) CDS were
traded on OTC markets, with a lack of transparency that enabled price gouging, iv)
CDS give investors (at least those who wrote much more insurance than the underlying assets were worth) the incentive to manipulate markets, for example to avoid
paying oﬀ a big insurance amount by directly paying oﬀ the bonds. George Soros
went as far as calling CDS “instruments of destruction that should be outlawed”
and claimed that “...some derivatives ought not to be allowed to be traded at all. I
have in mind credit default swaps. The more I’ve heard about them, the more I’ve
realized they’re truly toxic,”1
The ﬁrst main contribution of this paper is to show that tranching and leverage
raise the price of the underlying collateral even if they have no eﬀect on the total cash
ﬂows coming from the collateral. All the diﬃculties with tranching and CDS pointed
out by others in the last paragraphs rely on the pernicious eﬀect of securitization
and tranching on the basic cash ﬂows. So our thesis is quite diﬀerent. But it is
really common sense. Indeed the historically enthusiastic government support for
1

Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2009.
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Figure 3: CDS Markets. Outstanding notional amount.
the tranching of mortgages was doubtless due to an understanding that it raises the
price of the underlying mortgage assets and therefore reduces the borrowing costs to
the homeowner.
Tranching makes the underlying collateral more valuable because it can be broken
into pieces that are tailor made for diﬀerent parts of the population, just as the
traders in the 1990s realized. Splitting plain vanilla into strawberry for one group
and chocolate for another should raise the value of the scarce ice cream. Leverage
is an imperfect form of tranching and one would guess that therefore leverage would
not raise the asset price as much as tranching.
We ﬁrst build a static two-period model with heterogeneous agents in which
we can investigate the circumstances under which these common sense conclusions
hold true. We compute equilibrium prices without leverage, with leverage, then with
tranching, then with tranching and CDS. We ﬁnd that once the tranching technology
is invented and freely available, it will inevitably proceed in equilibrium all the way
to Arrow securities, or at least all the way to commonly veriﬁable events. Leverage
and asset tranching always raise asset prices above their CDS and no-leverage levels.
6

Somewhat surprisingly, however, we ﬁnd that this ﬁne tranching does not always
raise the asset price above the leverage price when all the general equilibrium eﬀects
are taken into account. We prove that if there is more heterogeneity among the
pessimists than among the optimists, then tranching always yields a higher price
than leverage which in turn is higher than the no-leverage price.
Furthermore, we show that with tranching, the price of the underlying collateral
can rise above what any agent thinks it is worth, while with leverage the price of the
asset typically rises to what a more optimistic agent thinks it is worth. This tranched
hyper price ﬁts the deﬁnition of a bubble given in Harrison and Kreps (1978), where
a bubble is deﬁned as an asset price that is higher than any agent thinks the asset is
worth. In Harrison and Kreps the explanation for bubbles turned on the ability of
agents to resell the asset to others who would think it was worth more, whereas in
our two-period model there is no resale of the asset.
Third, we show that the introduction of CDS dramatically lowers the asset price,
even below the non-leverage level, provided that the median investor thinks that the
asset is more than 50% likely to have a good payoﬀ. This seems counterintuitive at
ﬁrst glance. Tranching creates derivatives of the underlying asset, and presumably
one of those tranches could have exactly the same payouts as the CDS. Indeed that
happens in our model. The tranche and the CDS are perfect substitutes in every
agent’s mind. Yet when the CDS is created exclusively inside the securitization as a
tranche of the asset, it raises the asset price. When the CDS is created outside the
securitization it lowers the asset price. How could this be?
We show that on second thought this is not surprising at all. When agents sell
CDS and put up cash as collateral, they are eﬀectively tranching cash! That raises
the value of cash relative to the reference asset. When every asset (more precisely,
when all future cash ﬂows) can be perfectly tranched, we get the Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium, and all asset bubbles disappear. The depressing eﬀect of CDS on asset
prices is most dramatic when the asset is not tranched, but is held outright or levered,
because in that case the buyers of the asset will divert their wealth into writing CDS,
which is a perfect substitute for holding the asset.
In Section 2 we present our two period model of collateral equilibrium. In Section
3 we show how specifying the collateral technology in diﬀerent ways allows the same
model to encompass leverage, tranching, and CDS in one simple framework. In
Section 4 we explain why leverage and securitization raise asset prices, and why
7

CDS lowers them. Finally in Section 5 we describe a dynamic model in which a
non-levered initial situation is followed by the unexpected introduction of leverage,
then securitization and tranching and ﬁnally CDSs. All the way through very small
bad shocks are occurring. Nevertheless, prices rise dramatically during the initial
three phases, then come crashing down with the introduction of CDSs.
The timing of the ﬁnancial innovation was crucial. Tranching and securitization
came ﬁrst, raising asset prices, then CDS followed much later, crushing their prices.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show empirical evidence suggesting that this was indeed the
timing in securitization and CDS markets. 2 The timing of innovation was disastrous
because it caused a crash, forcing many people into bankruptcy or underwater. Had
the CDS come at the same time as the securitization, asset prices would never have
gotten so high, and the crash would have been milder, as we show in Section 5.
Our ﬁnancial innovation theory of booms and busts complements the Leverage
Cycle theory proposed in Geanakoplos (2003, 2010a and 2010b) and developed further in Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008, 2010 and 2011). The ﬁnancial innovation theory
is similar in many ways to the leverage cycle, but unlike that theory, it does not rely
on any kind of shock, much less on a shock that also increases the volatility of future
shocks. In the ﬁnancial innovation story of the boom and bust told here, innovation
could have generated the entire cycle on its own, with no external triggers.
In the leverage cycle story of the recent boom and bust told in Geanakoplos (2010a
and 2010b), a prolonged period of low volatility led to high leverage and therefore
high asset prices and the concentration of assets in the hands of the most optimistic
investors. When bad news came in 2007 in the form of a spike in delinquencies
of subprime homeowners, it not only directly reduced prices but it also reduced
leverage, because it created more uncertainty about what would happen next, which
had an indirect eﬀect on asset prices. The combination of bad news, losses by the
hyper-leveraged optimists, and plummeting leverage led to a huge fall in asset prices,
much bigger than could be explained by the bad news alone.
Geanakoplos (2010b) attributed the rise in leverage to many factors besides low
volatility. One of these was the almost explicit government guarantees to Government
Agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and another was the implicit guarantees
to the big banks who were too big to fail. Yet another was low interest rates and
2

Academic papers describing the ﬁnancial crisis all agree on this fact, as in Brunnermeier (2009),
Gorton (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2010), Geanakoplos (2010) and Stultz (2009).
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the resulting pursuit of yield. But most important he said was securitization. Yet he
provided no model for the connection between securitization and leverage. Geanakoplos 2010a, 2010b, also suggested that the introduction of standardized credit default
swaps in 2005 had a sharp negative impact on the prices of assets.
Here we make rigorous the connection between leverage, tranching, and asset
prices by extending the model in Geanakoplos (2003). In the language of FostelGeanakoplos (2008), tranching increases the collateral value of the underlying asset.
Leverage is an imperfect form of tranching and so raises the underlying asset value
less than ideal tranching. CDS is a form of tranching cash, and so raises the relative
value of cash, thus lowering the value of the reference asset.
Our paper is more generally related to a literature on leverage as in Araujo, Kubler
and Schommer (2011), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011), Adrian and Shin (2010),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Cao (2010), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008, 2010
and 2011), Geanakoplos (1997, 2003 and 2010), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and
Simsek (2010). It is also related to work that studies the asset price implications
of leverage as Hindy (1994), Hindy and Huang (1995) and Garleanu and Pedersen
(2009).
Our paper is also part of a growing theoretical literature on CDS. Bolton and
Oehmke (2011) study the eﬀect of CDS on the debtor-creditor relationship. The
proposition that CDS tends to lower asset prices was demonstrated in Geanakoplos
(2010a), and conﬁrmed in exactly the same model by Che and Sethi (2010).

2

General Equilibrium Model with Collateral

The model is a two-period general equilibrium model, with time t = 0, 1. Uncertainty
is represented by a tree S = {0, U, D} with a root s = 0 at time 0 and two states of
nature s = U, D at time 1.
There are two assets in the economy which produce dividends of the consumption
good at time 1. The riskless asset X produces XU = XD = 1 unit of the consumption
good in each state, and the risky asset Y produces YU = 1 unit in state U and
0 < YD = R < 1 unit of the consumption good in state D. Figure 4 shows asset
payoﬀs.
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Figure 4: Asset Payoﬀs.
Each investor in the continuum h ∈ H = (0, 1) is risk neutral and characterized
by a linear utility for consumption of the single consumption good x at time 1, and
h
subjective probabilities, (qUh , qD
= 1 − qUh ). The von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility to agent h is
h
xD
U h (xU , xD ) = qUh xU + qD

(1)

We shall suppose that qUh is strictly monotonically increasing and continuous in
h
h
h. Examples are qUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 , qD
= (1 − h)2 and qUh = h, qD
= 1 − h.
Each investor h ∈ (0, 1) has an endowment of one unit of each asset at time 0 and
nothing else. Since only the output of Y depends on the state and 1 > R, higher
h denotes more optimism. Heterogeneity among the agents stems entirely from the
dependence of qUh on h.
The reader may be aghast by the simplicity of the model, and in particular by
heterogeneous priors, risk neutrality and the lack of endowment of the consumption
good in states 1 and 2. We hasten to assure such a reader that we are using the
10

simplest model we can to illustrate our point. None of the results depend on risk
neutrality or heterogeneous priors. By assuming common probabilities and strictly
concave utilities, and adding large endowments in state D vs state U for agents
with high h and low endowments in state D vs state U for agents with low h, we
could reproduce the distribution of marginal utilities we get from diﬀerences in prior
probabilities. We have chosen to replace the usual marginal analysis of consumers
who have interior consumption with a continuum of agents and a marginal buyer.
Our view is that the slightly unconventional modeling is a small price to pay for the
simple tractability of the analysis.

2.1

Arrow Debreu Equilibrium

Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is easy to describe for our simple economy. It is given by
present value consumption prices (pU , pD ), which without loss of generality we can
normalize to add up to 1, and by consumption (xhU , xhD )h∈H satisfying
1.

1 h
x dh

=1+1

2.

1 h
x dh

=1+R

0
0

U

D

h
2
3. (xhU , xhD ) ∈ BW
(pU , pD ) = {(xU , xD ) ∈ R+
: pU xU + pD xD ≤ pU (1 + 1) + pD (1 +
R)}
h
4. (xU , xD ) ∈ BW
(pU , pD ) ⇒ U h (x) ≤ U h (xh ), ∀h

The interpretation of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is that at time 0 agents trade
contingent commodities forward. An agent with high h for example might sell a
future claim for D consumption in exchange for U consumption. It is taken for
granted that h will deliver the goods in D if that state occurs.
We can easily compute Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Because of linear utilities and
the continuity of utility in h and the connectedness of the set of agents H = (0, 1), at
state s = 0 there will be a marginal buyer, h1 , who will be indiﬀerent between buying
the Arrrow U and the Arrow D security. All agents h > h1 will sell everything and
buy only the Arrow U security. Agents h < h1 will sell everything and buy only the
Arrow D security. This regime is showed is Figure 5.
At s = 0 aggregate revenue from sales of the Arrow U security is given by pU × 2.
On the other hand, aggregate expenditure on it by the buyers h ∈ [h1 , 1) is given by
(1 − h1 )(2pU + (1 + R)(1 − pU )). Equating we have
11

h=1

Optimist buyers of Arrow U security
h1

Marginal buyer

Pessimist buyers of Arrow D security

h=0

Figure 5: Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium Regime.

(2pU + (1 + R)(1 − pU ))(1 − h1 ) = 2pU

(2)

The next equation states that the marginal buyer is indiﬀerent between buying
the Arrow U and the Arrow D security.
qUh1 /pU = (1 − qUh1 )/(1 − pU )

(3)

Hence we have a system of two equations and two unknowns: the price of the
Arrow U security, pU , and the marginal buyer, h1 . For the probabilities qUh = 1 −
(1 − h)2 and R = .2, we get h1 = .33 and pU = .55. The implicit prices of X and Y
are pX = pU 1 + pD 1 = 1 and pY = pU 1 + pD R = .64.

2.2

Financial Contracts and Collateral

The heart of our analysis involves contracts and collateral. In Arrow Debreu equilibrium the question of why agents repay their loans is ignored. We suppose from
12

now on that the only enforcement mechanism is collateral.
At time 0 agents can trade ﬁnancial contracts. A ﬁnancial contract (A, C) consists
of both a promise, A = (AU , AD ), and an asset acting as collateral backing it,
C ∈ {X, Y }. The lender has the right to seize as much of the collateral as will make
him whole once the promise comes due, but no more: the contract therefore delivers
(min(AU , CU ), min(AD , CD )) in the two states. The signiﬁcance of the collateral is
that the borrower must own the collateral C at time 0 in order to make the promise
A.
We shall suppose every contract is collateralized either by one unit of X or by
one unit of Y . The set of promises j backed by one unit of X is denoted by J X and
the set of contracts backed by one unit of Y is denoted by J Y . In the next section
we will analyze diﬀerent economies obtained by varying the set J = J X ∪ J Y .
We shall denote the sale of promise j by ϕj > 0 and the purchase of the same
contract by ϕj < 0. The sale of a contract corresponds to borrowing the sale price,
and the purchase of a promise is tantamount to lending the price in return for the
promise. The sale of ϕj > 0 units of contract type j ∈ J X requires the ownership
of ϕj units of X, whereas the purchase of the same number of contracts does not
require any ownership of X.

2.3

Budget Set

Each contract j ∈ J C will trade for a price π j . An investor can borrow π j today by
selling contract j in exchange for a promise of Aj tomorrow, provided he owns C.
We can always normalize one price in each state s ∈ S = {0, U, D}, so we take
the price of X in state 0 and the price of consumption in each state U ,D to be one.
Thus X is both riskless and the numeraire, hence it is in some ways analogous to
a durable consumption good like gold, or to money, in our one commodity model.
Given asset and contract prices at time 0, (p, (π j )j∈J ), each agent h ∈ H decides
his asset holdings x of X and y of Y and contract trades ϕj in state 0 in order to
maximize utility (1) subject to the budget set deﬁned by
X

Y

B h (p, π) = {(x, y, ϕ, xU , xD ) ∈ R+ × R+ × RJ × RJ × R+ × R+ :

(x − 1) + p(y − 1) ≤ j∈J ϕj π j


j∈J X max(0, ϕj ) ≤ x,
j∈J Y max(0, ϕj ) ≤ y
13





xU = x + y − j∈J X ϕj min(AjU , 1) − j∈J Y ϕj min(AjU , 1)


xD = x + yR − j∈J X ϕj min(AjD , 1) − j∈J Y ϕj min(AjD , R)}
At time 0 expenditures on the assets purchased (or sold) can be at most equal to
the money borrowed selling contracts using the assets as collateral. The assets put
up as collateral must indeed be owned. In the ﬁnal states, consumption must equal
dividends of the assets held minus debt repayment.
Notice that there is no sign constraint on ϕj ; a positive (negative) ϕj indicates
the agent is selling (buying) contracts or borrowing (lending) π j . Notice also that
we are assuming that short selling of assets is not possible, x, y ≥ 0.

2.4

Collateral Equilibrium

We suppose that agents are uniformly distributed in (0, 1), that is they are described
by Lebesgue measure. A Collateral Equilibrium in this economy is a price of asset
Y, contract prices, asset purchases, contract trade and consumption decisions by all
X
Y
J
) × (R+ × R+ × RJ × RJ ×
the agents ((p, π), (xh , y h , ϕh , xhU , xhD )h∈H ) ∈ (R+ × R+
R+ × R+ )H such that
1.

1 h
x dh

=1

2.

1 h
y dh

=1

3.

1

0
0
0

ϕhj dh = 0 ∀j ∈ J

4. (xh , y h , ϕh , xhU , xhD ) ∈ B h (p, π), ∀h
5. (x, y, ϕ, xU , xD ) ∈ B h (p, π) ⇒ U h (x) ≤ U h (xh ), ∀h
Markets for the consumption good in all states clear, assets and promises clear
in equilibrium at time 0, and agents optimize their utility in their budget sets. As
shown by Geanakoplos and Zame (1997), equilibrium in this model always exists
under the assumptions we made so far.
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2.5

Tranching

One of the most important ﬁnancial innovations has been the “tranching” of assets or
collateral. In tranched securitizations the collateral dividend payments are divided
among a number of bonds which are sold oﬀ to separate buyers. So far in our analysis
we have assumed that each collateral can back just one promise, so tranching seems
out of the picture. But in fact the collateral holder gets the residual payments after
the promise is paid, so eﬀectively we have been tranching into two bonds all along.
And with two states of nature, we shall show that there is no reason to have more
pieces. So as long as there is no restriction on the nature of the promise, our collateral
equilibrium includes tranching.
In practice houses have been tranched into ﬁrst and second mortgages, and sometimes third mortgages. These tranches have the property that they all move in the
same direction: good news for the house value is good news for all the tranches. But
when mortgages are tranched, the tranche values often move in opposite directions.
The more a ﬂoater pays, the less an inverse ﬂoater pays and so on. Even when
the tranches of subprime mortgages appear to have the form of debt for the higher
tranches, and equity for the lower tranches, the presence of various triggers which
move cash ﬂows from one tranche to another can make the payoﬀs go in opposite
directions.
Thus in what follows we shall assume in our analysis that tranching has reached
a degree of perfection that permits Arrow security tranches to be created.3 The
tranching of mortgages in the CMO revolution of the 1990s moved far along in that
direction. And to the extent that the mortgage principal amount is nearly as high
as the house price, as often occurred in the 2000s, the mortgage already includes the
entire future value of the house. Thus we shall not distinguish between tranching the
asset or tranching a mortgage written on the asset. In short we shall assume that
the tranching is directly backed by the asset.
3
Of course, in reality Arrow securities cannot be created. But the reason has to do with the
lack of veriﬁability and the cost of writing complex contingencies into a contract, both of which are
ignored in our analysis.
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3

Leverage, Securitization, and CDS

In this section we study the eﬀect of leverage and derivatives on equilibrium by
considering four diﬀerent versions of the collateral economy introduced in the last
section, each deﬁned by a diﬀerent set of feasible contracts J. We describe each
variation and the system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium. In the next
section we compare equilibrium asset prices across all the economies.

3.1

No-Leverage Economy

We consider ﬁrst the simplest possible scenario where no promises at all can be made,
J = ∅. Agents can only trade assets Y and X. They cannot borrow using the assets
as collateral.
Let us describe the system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium. Because of the strict monotonicity and continuity of qUh in h, and the linear utilities
and the connectedness of the set of agents H = (0, 1), at state s = 0 there will be a
unique marginal buyer, h1 , who will be indiﬀerent between buying or selling Y . In
equilibrium it turns out that all agents h > h1 will buy all they can aﬀord of Y while
selling all their endowment of X. Agents h < h1 will sell all their endowment of Y .
This regime is shown in Figure 6.
At s = 0 aggregate revenue from sales of the asset is given by p × 1.4 On the
other hand, aggregate expenditure on the asset is given by (1 − h1 )(1 + p), which is
total income from the endowment of one unit of X, plus revenue from the sale of one
unit of asset Y by buyers h ∈ [h1 , 1). Equating supply and demand we have
p = (1 − h1 )(1 + p)

(4)

The next equation states that the price at s = 0 is equal to the marginal buyer’s
valuation of the asset’s future payoﬀ.
p = qUh1 1 + (1 − qUh1 )R
4

(5)

All asset endowments add to 1 and without loss of generality are put up for sale even by those
who buy it.
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h=1

Optimist buyers of the asset
h1

Marginal buyer

Pessimist sellers of the asset

h=0

Figure 6: Non-Leverage Economy Equilibrium Regime.
Hence we have a system of two equations and two unknowns: the price of the
asset, p, and the marginal buyer, h1 . For the probabilities qUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 and
R = .2, we get h1 = .54 and p = .83.

3.2

Leverage Economy

Agents now are allowed to borrow money to buy more of the risky asset Y . We
let them issue non-contingent promises using the asset as collateral. In this case
J = J Y , and each Aj = (j, j) for all j ∈ J = J Y . The following result regarding
leverage holds.
Proposition 1: Suppose that in equilibrium the max min contract j ∗ = mins=U,D {Ys } =
R is available to be traded, that is j ∗ ∈ J = J Y . Then j ∗ is the only contract traded,
∗
and the risk-less interest rate is equal to zero, this is, π j = j ∗ = R.
Proof: See Geanakoplos (2003) and Fostel-Geanakoplos (2010 and 2011).
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Leverage is endogenously determined in equilibrium. In particular, the proposition derives the conclusion that although all contracts will be priced in equilibrium,
the only contract actively traded is the max min contract, which corresponds to
the Value at Risk equal zero rule, V aR = 0, assumed by many other papers in the
literature. Hence there is no default in equilibrium.
Taking the proposition as given, let us describe the system of equations that
characterizes the equilibrium. As before, there will be a marginal buyer, h1 , who will
be indiﬀerent between buying or selling Y . In equilibrium all agents h > h1 will buy
all they can aﬀord of Y , i.e., they will sell all their endowment of the X and borrow
to the max min using Y as collateral. Agents h < h1 will sell all their endowment of
Y and lend to the more optimistic investors. The regime is showed in Figure 7.

h=1
Optimist buyers/leveraged
h1

Marginal buyer

Pessimist sellers/lenders

h=0

Figure 7: Leverage Economy Equilibrium Regime.
At s = 0 aggregate revenue from sales of the asset is given by p × 1. On the
other hand, aggregate expenditure on the asset is given by (1 − h1 )(1 + p) + R. The
ﬁrst term is total income (endowment of X plus revenues from asset sales) of buyers
h ∈ [h1 , 1). The second term is borrowing, which from proposition 1 is R (recall that
the interest rate is zero). Equating we have
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p = (1 − h1 )(1 + p) + R

(6)

The next equation states that the price at s = 0 is equal to the marginal buyer’s
valuation of the asset’s future payoﬀ.
p = qUh1 1 + (1 − qUh1 )R

(7)

We have a system of two equations and two unknowns: the price of the asset,
p, and the marginal buyer, h1 . Notice how equation (6) diﬀers from equation (4).
Optimists now can borrow R. This will imply that in equilibrium a fewer number of
optimists can aﬀord to buy all the asset in the economy. Hence, the marginal buyer
in the Leverage economy will be someone more optimistic than the marginal buyer
in the No-Leverage economy. We will discuss this in detail in Section 4. For the
probabilities qUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 and R = .2, we get h1 = .63 and p = .89.
Finally, notice that buying the asset while leveraging to the max min is equivalent
to buying the Arrow U security. Since the owner needs to pay back R in period 1, his
net payoﬀs are 1 − R at U and 0 at D. Hence, optimistic investors who are desperate
to transfer their wealth to the U state can very eﬀectively do that by leveraging the
asset to the max min. In equilibrium, the implicit price of the Arrow U security is
= .86.
given by pU = p−R
1−R

3.3

Asset-Tranching Economy

In this economy we suppose that the risky asset Y can be tranched into arbitrary
contingent promises, including the riskless promises from the last section and all
Arrow promises. The holder of the asset can sell oﬀ any of the tranches he does
not like and retain the rest. This is a step forward from the leverage economy, in
which investors holding a leveraged position on the asset could synthetically create
the Arrow U security. Now they can also synthetically create the Arrow D security.
To simplify the analysis we suppose at ﬁrst that J = J Y consists of the single
promise A = (0, R), tantamount to a multiple of the Arrow D security. Notice that
by buying the asset Y and selling oﬀ the tranche (0, R), any agent can obtain the
Arrow U security. Our parsimonious description of J = J Y therefore already includes
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the possibility of tranching Y into Arrow securities. We shall see shortly that once
that is possible, there is no reason to consider further tranches.
Let us describe the system of equations that characterizes the tranching equilibrium with the single tranche A = (0, R). In this case it is easy to see that there will
be two marginal buyers h1 and h2 . In equilibrium all agents h > h1 will buy all of
Y , and sell the down tranche A = (0, R), hence eﬀectively holding only the Arrow
U security. Agents h2 < h < h1 will sell all their endowment of Y and purchase all
of the durable consumption good X. Finally, agents h < h2 will sell their assets Y
and X and buy the down tranche from the most optimistic investors. The regime is
showed in Figure 8.

h=1
Optimists: buy asset and sell Arrow Down tranche
(hence holding the Arrow Up tranche)
Marginal buyer

h1
Moderates: hold the durable good.

h2

Marginal buyer

Pessimists: buy the Arrow Down tranche.

h=0

Figure 8: Asset Tranching Economy Equilibrium Regime.
The system of equations that characterizes equilibrium is the following. Let πD
denote the price of the down tranche. Equation (8) states that money spent on the
asset should equal the aggregate revenue from its sale. The top 1 − h1 agents are
buying the asset and selling oﬀ the down tranche. They each have wealth 1 + p plus
the revenue from the tranche sale πD . Finally, there is 1 unit of total supply of the
asset. Hence we have
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(1 − h1 )(1 + p) + πD = p

(8)

Notice that the implicit price of the Arrow U security, which the top 1−h1 agents
are eﬀectively buying, equals pU = p − πD , the price of the asset minus the price of
the down tranche A = (0, R).
Equation (9) states that total money spent on the down tranche should equal
aggregate revenues from their sale. The bottom h2 agents spend all their endowments
to buy all the down tranches available in the economy (which is one since there is
one asset), at the price of πD .
h2 (1 + p) = πD

(9)

Equation (10) states that h1 is indiﬀerent between buying the Arrow U security
and holding the durable consumption good. So his expected marginal utility from
buying the Arrow U security, the probability qUh1 multiplied by the delivery of 1,
divided by its price, p − πD , equals the expected marginal utility of holding the
durable consumption good divided by its price, 1.
qUh1
=1
p − πD

(10)

Finally, equation (11) states that h2 is indiﬀerent between holding the down
tranche and the durable consumption good X. So his expected marginal utility from
buying the down tranche, which is the probability 1 − qUh2 multiplied by the payoﬀ R,
divided by its price, πD , equals the expected marginal utility of holding the durable
consumption good divided by its price, 1.
(1 − qUh2 )R
=1
πD

(11)

We have a system of four equations and four unknowns: the price of the asset, p,
the price of the down tranche πD , and the two marginal buyers, h1 and h2 .
Finally, notice that despite the fact that both Arrow securities are present, markets are not complete. Arrow securities are created through the asset. Hence, agents
cannot sell all the Arrow securities they desire and the Arrow-Debreu allocation
cannot be implemented. Tranching the asset is not enough to complete markets.
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For the probabilities qUh = 1−(1−h)2 and R = .2, we get h1 = .58, h2 = .08, p = 1
and πD = .17. The asset price is much higher even than it was with leverage. The
simple reason is that leverage is an imperfect form of tranching. When the owner of
the asset Y can create pieces even better suited to heterogenous buyers it makes the
asset still more attractive.
One important conclusion to be drawn from combining equations (10) and (11)
is that the tranching asset price is
h2
R
p = qUh1 1 + qD

(12)

Interestingly, the asset price can be higher than any agent in the economy thinks
it is worth!. Deﬁning the implicit Arrow security prices pU = p − πD = .83 and
pD = πD /R = .83, we see that p = pU + pD R > 1. We discuss how this could happen
in Section 4.
A moment’s reﬂection should convince the reader that in our two state economy,
completely tranching Y is tantamount to allowing the asset to back a promise of R in
the down state. The asset holder on net then retains the U Arrow security. By buying
y units of Y and selling oﬀ y units of the tranche A = (0, R), and also buying z/R
units of the down tranche (perhaps created by somebody else), any agent who has
enough wealth can eﬀectively purchase the arbitrary consumption xU = y, xD = z.
If it were possible to create diﬀerent tranches beyond the two Arrow securities, no
agent would have anything to gain by doing so. In the end his new tranches would
not oﬀer a potential buyer anything the buyer could not obtain for himself via the
Arrow tranches, as we just saw. With unlimited and costless tranching, tranching
into Arrow securities always drives out all alternative tranching schemes, a point
made in Geanakoplos-Zame (2011). Since Y = {(0, R)} already embodies Arrow
tranching, there is no reason to consider any more complicated tranching schemes.

3.4

CDS Economy

A CDS on the asset Y is a contract that promises to pay 0 at s = U when Y pays 1
and promises 1 − R at s = D when Y pays only R. Figure 9 describes a comparison
between the underlying asset payoﬀs and the CDS payoﬀs.
A CDS is thus an insurance policy for Y. A seller of a CDS must post collateral,
typically in the form of money. In a two period model buyers of the insurance would
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Figure 9: CDS Payoﬀs.
insist on 1 − R of X as collateral. Thus for every one unit of payment, one unit of X
must be posted as collateral. We can therefore incorporate CDS into our economy
by taking J X to consist of one contract called c promising (0, 1).
We shall maintain our hypothesis that the asset Y itself can be tranched, so we
continue to suppose that J Y consists of the single promise (0, R) called the down
tranche or D. Of course that is equivalent to supposing that (1 − R)/R units of the
asset Y can be put up as collateral for 1 CDS promising 1 − R in state D. In other
words, the down tranche in the securitization of Y is identical to the CDS. Yet we
shall show that the two have very diﬀerent eﬀects on the price of Y.
Equilibrium requires that buyers recognize that D and c, the CDS, are essentially
proportional and hence in equilibrium their prices must be in the same proportion.
Equation (13) states that
πD = Rπc

(13)

Once equation (13) holds, it must also be the case that buyers recognize that
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there are two equivalent ways of eﬀectively buying the Arrow U security: tranching
the asset Y and tranching cash X. Hence we must have equation (14)
1
1
=
p − πD
1 − πc

(14)

Given these identities, it is evident that in equilibrium there will be a marginal
buyer h1 such that all agents h > h1 will buy all of Y and X and sell the down
tranche D backed by the Y and the CDS contract c collateralized with X. Agents
h < h1 will sell all their endowment of Y and X and buy D and c. The regime is
showed in Figure 10.

h=1
Optimists: buy Y and X and sell CDS and D tranche
Marginal buyer

h1

Pessimists: buy CDS and D tranche

h=0

Figure 10: CDS Economy Equilibrium Regime.

Equation (15) states that the total money spent on Y and X has to equal the
revenues from their sale. Agents 1 − h1 buy both. They use their endowments as
before but now they also receive income from the sales of D and c, using Y and X
as collateral respectively. The total wealth represented by the endowments of X and
Y is 1 + p per person, and the total revenue from the sale of D and C is πD + πc .
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This must equal the purchase cost of all the X and Y in the economy, which is also
1 + p. Hence
(1 − h1 )(1 + p) + πD + πc = 1 + p

(15)

Equation (16) states that the marginal buyer should be indiﬀerent between buying
the Arrow U security (either way he can) and buying the down tranche or the CDS.
qUh1
(1 − qUh1 )
=
p − πD
πc

(16)

A succinct way of describing the diﬀerence between this economy and the previous
one is that CDS allow for the tranching of cash in addition to the previous tranching
of assets. As a consequence, with only two states of the world, CDS and tranching
allow the economy to implement the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Hence, for the
probabilities qUh = (1 − h)2 and R = .2, we get the same equilibrium as the one
described in the Arrow-Debreu section. The price of the asset is given by p =
pU + RpD = .64.
Finally, a CDS can be “covered” or “naked” depending on whether the buyer of
the CDS needs to hold the underlying asset. Our previous discussion corresponds
to the case of “naked” CDS. When CDS must be “covered”, agents willing to buy
CDS need to hold the asset. But notice that holding the asset and buying a CDS is
equivalent to holding the risk-less bond, which was already available without CDS.
“Covered” CDS have no eﬀect on equilibrium. For the rest of the paper we will focus
only on the “naked” CDS case.

4

Financial Innovation and Asset Pricing

We solve for equilibrium with probabilities qUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 in all the economies
just described as R varies. Figure 11 displays the Y asset prices p for diﬀerent values
of R.5
For all economies the asset price increases as R increases and disagreement disappears. This is not surprising, since the asset clearly makes more payments the
5

Complete results are presented in Table 1 in Appendix C.
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Figure 11: Asset Prices in all economies for diﬀerent values of R.
higher is R and so naturally its price should increase. We come back to how far it
should increase shortly.
By far the most important implication of our numerical simulations is that leverage and tranching make the asset price higher than it would be without leverage,
and still higher than it would be in the CDS or Arrow-Debreu economy. Leverage
and derivatives thus have a profound eﬀect on asset prices. And therefore so does
ﬁnancial innovation. We now investigate how general these results are.
Proposition 2: The asset price in the Leverage economy is higher than in the NoLeverage economy for all strictly monotonic and continuous qUh , and all 0 < R < 1.
Proof: From equation (4) we see that in the No-Leverage economy
1
L
hN
1

= 1 + pN L
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while in the Leverage economy, from equation (6),
1
R
+ L = 1 + pL
L
h1
h1
L
Assuming R > 0, pN L ≥ pL only if hL1 > hN
1 . But from equations (5) and (7) (which
say that the asset price is equal to the marginal buyer’s valuation) these last two
inequalities are not compatible.QED.

As discussed before, the possibility of borrowing against the asset makes it possible for fewer investors to hold all the asset in the economy. Hence, the marginal buyer
is someone more optimistic than in the No-Leverage economy, raising the price of the
asset. This eﬀect was ﬁrst identiﬁed in Geanakoplos (1997, 2003). This connection
between leverage and asset prices is precisely the Leverage Cycle theory discussed in
Geanakoplos (2003, 2010a, 2010b) and Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008, 2010 and 2011).
This theory can rationalize the housing market behavior during the crisis. Leverage
on housing increased dramatically from 2000 to 2006 and housing prices increased
dramatically during the same time. Leverage on housing collapsed in 2007 and the
same happened to housing prices.
The boost in the price of Y from leverage is greatest for intermediate values of
R, a region that can be characterized as “normal times” and when disagreement
is not negligible. For too low values of R, agents can borrow very little against
the asset and hence the marginal buyer will be someone very close to the marginal
buyer when borrowing is not possible. On the other extreme, when R is very high,
though borrowing is very important, agents almost agree on the outcome of the asset,
pushing even the no-leverage price up near to 1. Next we turn to tranching.
Proposition 3: The asset price in the Tranching economy is higher than in
the No-Leverage economy for all strictly monotonic and continuous qUh , and for all
0 < R < 1.
Proof: From equation (8) in the Tranching economy, we see that
T
1
πD
+
= 1 + pT
hT1
hT1

From equation (4) we see that in the No-Leverage economy
1
L
hN
1

= 1 + pN L
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L
Then pN L ≥ pT only if hL1 > hN
1 . But from equations (5) and (12) these last two
inequalities are not compatible.QED.

In the numerical simulations, tranching raised the asset price even above the
Leverage economy price. But this need not always be the case. Consider for example
the beliefs given by
qUh = max{1 − (1 − h)2 , 1 − (1 − .60)2 }
The Leverage economy equilibrium calculated earlier is still the same, since the
marginal buyer was hL1 = .63. But in the Tranching economy, the marginal buyer is
hT1 < .60 and the price will therefore be .84(1)+.16(.2) = .872 < .89. In general, hT1 <
hT
hT
hL1 . The tranching price becomes higher than the leverage price when qU1 +qD2 >> 1,
hT
hT
because then the tranching price pT = qU1 1 + qD2 R can be very large. In the example
hT
hT
just given the probabilities are cooked up so that qU1 = qU2 .
All this suggests that the tranching price is higher than the leverage price when
there is more heterogeneity at the bottom, among the pessimists, than there is at
the top among the optimists. Indeed the following is true.
Proposition 4: If the probabilities qUh are concave in h, as well as strictly monotonic and continuous, then the asset price in the Tranching economy is higher than
in the Leverage economy for all 0 < R < 1.
Proof: From equations (7) and (12) and the fact that hT1 > hT2 , we have that
hL

hL

hL

hT

hT

hT

pL = qU1 1 + qD1 R = R + qU1 (1 − R)
pT = qU1 1 + qD2 R > R + qU1 (1 − R)
hL

hT

Assume temporarily that pL ≥ pT . Then we must have qU1 > qU1 , so hL1 > hT1 ,
hT
hL
and hence (qD1 − qD1 ) > 0. Putting the above two equations together,
hL

hT

hT

hT

hT

hL

pT − pL = −(qU1 − qU1 )1 + [(qD2 − qD1 ) + (qD1 − qD1 )]R
hL

hT

hT

To get our desired contradiction, it suﬃces to show that (qU1 − qU1 ) < (qD2 −
hT
hL
hT
hT
qD1 )R. From the hypothesized concavity of q h in h and from qD1 > qD1 > qD2 , it
suﬃces to show that hL1 − hT1 < (hT1 − hT2 )R. From equations (6) and (8) we know
that
(1 − hL1 )(1 + pL ) + R = pL
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1+R
= hL1
L
1+p
(1 − hT1 )(1 + pT ) + πD = pT
1 + πD
= hT1
1 + pT
If pL ≥ pT , then
hL1 − hT1 ≤

R − πD
R
<
T
1+p
1 + pT

On the other hand, from equations (10) and (11) and Walras Law, we know that in
the tranching equilibrium, the agents between hT1 and hT2 must hold all the X, hence
hT1 − hT2 =

1
1 + pT

From the last two equations and the concavity of qUh ,
hL

hT

hT

hT

hT

hT

qU1 − qU1 < R(qU1 − qU2 ) = R(qD2 − qD1 )
From the equation above and our earlier calculations, we conclude pT −pL > 0.QED.
The idea of the proof is that the tranching price tends to be lower than the
hL
hT
leverage price because qU1 > qU1 , since hL1 > hT1 . But the tranching asset price rises
hT
hT
because qD2 > qD1 since hT1 > hT2 . By concavity the gap between hT1 and hT2 has a
bigger eﬀect than the gap between hL1 and hT1 .
Our examples where qUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 or qUh = h, both satisfy the concavity
hypothesis. A striking consequence of the power of securitization to raise the asset
price can be seen as R increases in our example with qUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 . As the
graph shows, the price of the asset with tranching goes even above 1. This seems
puzzling since the durable good X delivers at least as much as the asset in every
state and its price in equilibrium equals 1. With leverage, the price rose because the
marginal buyer became a more optimistic agent, and the price came to reﬂect his
beliefs instead of the more pessimistic marginal buyer that obtained without leverage.
However, with leverage the asset price can never rise above 1, since no agent values
the asset at more than 1. But with tranching, the price can rise above what any agent
thinks it is worth. How can this be? The answer is that with tranching there are two
marginal buyers instead of one. The marginal buyer with leverage was indiﬀerent
between the asset and the two cash ﬂows into which leverage split it, and his beliefs
determined the price of the asset. In the tranching equilibrium the cash ﬂows into
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which the asset is split are held by diﬀerent people, and nobody who wants one ﬂow
would touch the other.
The tranching of the asset Y that was begun with leverage is perfected by tranching into Arrow securities. Leverage is a precursor or primitive form of tranching.
With leverage the asset can be used as collateral to issue non-contingent promises.
In the tranching economy, the asset can be used as collateral to issue contingent
promises raising even further its value as collateral. Y becomes so valuable because
it can broken into pieces that are tailor made for diﬀerent parts of the population.
Splitting plain vanilla into strawberry for one group and chocolate for another raises
the value of the scarce ice cream.
This result parallels the result in Harrison and Kreps (78), who deﬁned a bubble
as a situation in which an asset is priced higher than any agent thinks its cash
ﬂows are worth. But we obtain the result in a static context without resale of the
asset. They displayed bubbles in a dynamic context with heterogeneous agents: the
most optimistic agent would buy the asset, but next period instead of suﬀering bad
cash ﬂows he could resell the asset to a diﬀerent agent. In our context, tranching
alone, without resale, creates collateral value and potentially bubbles. The gap in
prices between leveraged (or securitized) assets and unleveraged assets is what FostelGeanakoplos (2008) called Collateral Value. When assets can be used as collateral to
borrow and not just as investment, there are deviations from classical forms of Law
of One Price. An asset with identical or inferior payoﬀs in the future can be priced
higher if it has higher collateral capacities.
This result is in tune with developments in the ﬁnancial market. For more than
ﬁve years securitized mortgages traded at negative OAS.6 Securitization and tranching dramatically increased from the 1990s to 2006, along with leverage, explaining,
in our view, much of the rise in housing and related securities prices.
Finally, we turn our attention to the CDS Economy. The numerical simulations
show that CDS can dramatically lower the asset price, even below the no-leverage
6

Option Adjusted Spread (OAS) is the fudge factor Wall Street ﬁrms add to their pricing model
when all their risk factors are unable to explain market prices. Typically this number is positive,
suggesting that the market is willing to pay less than the model values because of the fear of some
unknown risk the modelers may have missed. But for mortgages around 2000 this OAS number
turned negative. We are suggesting here the reason is that FNMA and Freddie Mac were willing
to pay more for the mortgages than their cash ﬂows warranted because they could use them to
create pools which would then be cut by Wall Street into more valuable tranches. An alternative
explanation is that because of their implicit government guarantees, FNMA and Freddie Mac could
borrow at cheaper rates than anybody else and hence were willing to overpay for their assets.
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level. In the simulations, the lower the R, the bigger is the price reduction from
the introduction of the CDS. For very high R, the introduction of CDS has little
eﬀect on asset prices when compared to the no-leverage level. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5: The asset price in the CDS economy is lower than in the Leverage economy and lower than in the Tranching economy, for all strictly monotonic
and continuous qUh and for all 0 < R < 1.
Proof: Recall from equations (6), (8) that
1+R
= hL1
L
1+p
hT

1 + qD1 R
= hT1
1 + pT
Next, recall that the CDS equilibrium is the same as the Arrow-Debreu equihCDS
librium. Hence pCDS = pAD = pU 1 + pD R. From equation (3), pD = qD1 . From
equation (2) and Walras Law,
hCDS

qD1 (1 + R)
= hCDS
1
1 + pCDS
hCDS

hT

Suppose that pCDS ≥ pT . Then the marginal buyer hCDS
> hT1 , hence qD1 < qD1 .
1
But this contradicts the last two equations above. Similarly, if pCDS ≥ pL then the
> hL1 , contradicting the ﬁrst and third equations above.QED.
marginal buyer hCDS
1
The stunning fact that the introduction of CDS dramatically lowers the asset
price below the leverage price and below the tranching price seems counterintuitive
at ﬁrst glance. Tranching creates exactly the same derivative payouts as the CDS.
They are perfect substitutes in every agent’s mind. Yet when the CDS is created
exclusively inside the securitization as a tranche of the asset, it raises the asset price.
When the CDS is created outside the securitization it lowers the asset price.
On second thought this is not surprising at all. CDS are a way of tranching X.
When agents sell CDS and put up cash as collateral, they are eﬀectively tranching
cash! That raises the value of cash relative to other assets, lowering the others’
prices.
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However, the CDS price need not be lower than the no-leverage price. Indeed
if agents think the bad state is very likely, then in the limit, by equation (4) and
L
Walras Law, we would ﬁnd that hN
→ 1/(1 + R), while by equation (2) and Walras
1
CDS
Law, h1
→ 1. But if the median agent regards the good state as more likely than
the bad state, then the CDS price must be lower than the no-leverage price, as we
show in the next proposition.
Proposition 6: If the q hU are strictly monotonic and continuous in h and if
1/2
qU ≥ 1/2, then the asset price in the CDS economy is lower than in the No-Leverage
economy for all 0 < R < 1.
L
agents hold
Proof: Recall that in the No-Leverage economy, the top 1 − hN
1
L
all the asset and the bottom hN
agents hold all the durable good X, which is more
1
NL
valuable. Hence h1 > 1/2. In the CDS economy,
hCDS

hCDS
1

=

(1 + R)qD1

hCDS

2qU1

hCDS

+ (1 + R)qD1

hCDS

If hCDS
≥ 1/2, then by hypothesis qU1
≥ 1/2. But that contradicts the above
1
CDS
NL
equation for R < 1. Hence h1
< 1/2 < h1 , and therefore pN L > pCDS .QED.
Putting the last ﬁve propositions together, we get
Theorem: If the q hU are strictly monotonic, concave, and continuous in h and
1/2
if qU ≥ 1/2, then the Tranching asset price is greater than the Leverage asset price
which is greater than the No-Leverage asset price which is greater than the CDS asset
price, for all 0 < R < 1.
In Appendix A we give the equations for two more economies, which allow us
to see the depressing eﬀect of CDS on the asset price even more clearly. First we
consider what happens if cash X can be tranched by CDS, but Y cannot be tranched
or held as collateral for any kind of loan or derivative. Now the tranching boost to
price goes the other way, and the price of Y relative to X plummets still further.
Finally, we consider the situation which obtains today for many assets like sovereign
bonds. The underlying bond-asset is not tranched, but people can leverage their purchases of it. On the other hand they can use cash as collateral to write CDS on the
asset-bond. As we see in Appendix A in Figure 16, the Y asset price is below the complete markets, tranching-CDS price, but above the price where we have CDS backed
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by cash alone. The reason is that the asset Y can only be imperfectly tranched via
leverage, whereas the cash is perfectly tranched.

5

Dynamic Asset Prices: Bubbles and Crashes.

As we said at the outset, securitization emerged over a period of 20 years, and
then the CDS mortgage market suddenly exploded at the end of the securitization
boom. To model the implications of that dynamic we need to examine a multiperiod model. Needless to say, as long as nobody gets utility from holding collateral,
leverage, tranching, and CDS are irrelevant without uncertainty. Hence the dynamic
model must incorporate risk at each stage. To keep the model tractable (and thus to
avoid exponential growth in the number of states) we suppose that in every period
with high probability a tiny bit of bad news is received, which leaves the world a little
worse but much like it was, or with low probability all the uncertainty is resolved
and the good outcome obtains for sure from there on out. The most likely and most
interesting history occurs along the path of consecutive pieces of bad news. This
single history contains all the nodes at which the asset price is non-trivial. As we
shall see, this model is tractable, it assumes volatility increases with bad news (and
decreases with good news), and it makes leverage pro-cyclical.7
The risky asset payoﬀs are described in Figure 12, as are the probabilities of
the agents. At each point in time, there is either good news (with low probability
1 − (1 − h)2/N ) or bad news (with high probability (1 − h)2/N ). After good news,
uncertainty is completely resolved and the risky asset Y pays 1. However, after
bad news, the economy proceeds to the next period. After N consecutive periods
of bad news output materializes at R < 1. Notice that each agent believes that
the ﬁnal output of Y will be R with probability (1 − h)2 and 1 with probability
1 − (1 − h)2 , exactly as we had in the two period model of Section 2. Each agent
in the continuum h ∈ (0, 1) begins at time 0 with one unit of Y and one unit of X,
and has no further endowments. As before, X produces 1 unit of the consumption
good in every terminal state. We suppose that agents care only about expected
consumption in the terminal states.
7

Fostel-Geanakoplos (2010) show that this stochastic structure is not something crazy or adhoc. They show that investors, given the opportunity to choose between technologies that exhibit
positive or negative correlations between ﬁrst and second moments, they would mostly choose the
latter.
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Figure 12: Dynamic Asset Payoﬀs.
Notice that as bad news comes, future output volatility increases. In other words,
bad news is revealed very slowly and each piece of bad news comes attached with a
spike in volatility. This type of technology, in which ﬁrst moments and second moments of the asset distribution are negatively correlated, was introduced in Geanakoplos (2003) in a three-period tree, and studied extensively by Fostel-Geanakoplos
(2010). This kind of economy induces pro-cyclical leverage, meaning that each piece
of bad news also decreases leverage. One potential drawback (or advantage) to the
model is that it presumes that if at the beginning one agent is more optimistic than
another, then he remains more optimistic throughout.8
The No-Leverage, Leverage, Tranching, and CDS economies are deﬁned by their
contract structure, as in the static model. In each node s of the tree we are given
a set of one period contracts J X (s) using one unit of X as collateral and another
set of one period contracts J Y (s) using one unit of Y as collateral. For the NoLeverage economy, these sets are empty. For the Leverage economy, J X (s) is empty
and J Y (s) consists of all promises (j, j) in the following two successor states. For
8

This may be the reason why in our model agents would buy CDS contracts at the beginning if
they were available, rather than waiting until default becomes more likely.
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the Tranching economy J X (s) is empty and J Y (s) consists of all possible promises
in the two successor states. In the CDS economy we would like to deﬁne the CDS as
a contract promising 1 − R in the terminal state following all bad news. But then
the question is: how much X collateral will the market require at each node s? The
answer is just enough to cover the market value of the CDS at node sD, the successor
node of s after bad news. With that insight we can reproduce the CDS equilibrium
by assuming that J X (s) consists of the one period promise (0, 1) for all s, and that
J Y (s) consists of all possible promises in the two successor states.
Given the contract structure, equilibrium is deﬁned by analogy to what we did
in Section 2 for the two period model in which N = 1. However, for longer horizons agent optimization is much more complicated because agents must be forward
looking, anticipating what the price of Y will be in the successor states and taking
into account that they might not want to buy the risky asset Y today, even if its
expected payoﬀs exceed its price, because they might do better by waiting to buy it
next period when its price might be cheaper. All the equations that characterize the
equilibrium for each economy are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 13 shows the asset price evolution for the diﬀerent economies for R = .2
and N = 10.9 Note ﬁrst that at time 0 the leverage price and the tranching price are
much higher than they were at time 0 in the two-period economy. Multiple periods
increase the power of leverage and tranching to raise asset prices. The no-leverage
price at time 0 is exactly the same in the 10-period economy as in the two-period
economy.
As before, the tranching price starts out higher than all the others, followed by
the leverage price, then the non-leverage price, then the very low CDS price. As time
goes and bad news keeps occurring, the prices all fall (there is no point in presenting
the price after good news, since that is always 1). Since all the price lines end up at
nearly the same price near .2, the fall is inversely related to the starting point. In the
Leverage economy prices start higher and hence the the price crash is much bigger
than in the No-Leverage and CDS economies. Since the no-leverage marginal buyer
never changes (he has no reason to sell after bad news), the price always reﬂects his
opinion of expected output. Thus, in the Leverage economy the bigger price decline
must be from feedback eﬀects through deleveraging and through wealth loss among
the optimists. It is interesting that at the very beginning the leverage price is more
9

Complete results are presented in Table 2 in Appendix C.
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Figure 13: Asset Price Dynamics for N = 10.
stable than the non-leverage price, but picks up steam fast as more bad news comes
in. However, the really dramatic fall in price on just a tiny bit of bad news happens
in the Tranching economy.
By contrast the fall is much more modest in the CDS economy. Early securitization and tranching created a huge increase in asset prices. Had CDS been available
from the very beginning this over-valuation would not have happened.
However, as discussed in the introduction, CDS were actually introduced later.
Figure 14 shows the eﬀect on asset prices if CDS were introduced to a Tranching
economy in period t = 2. We distinguish two diﬀerent cases: a sudden, un-expected
introduction in which the economy is proceeding along as if CDS will never exist,
and an expected introduction in which from the very beginning it is known that CDS
will appear in period t = 2.
Without CDS, there would be a 17% drop in prices in the Tranching economy
after two pieces of bad news, as we saw in Figure 13. This drop becomes much bigger
if CDS appear in period t = 2, namely 28%, even if the appearance of CDS at time
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Figure 14: Late introduction of CDS at t = 2.
t = 2 is anticipated from the very beginning at time t = 0. The crash becomes a
horriﬁc 46% if the CDS appear in period t = 2 as a surprise.
In our view the key to the size of the crisis is the order of the ﬁnancial innovation that materialized. Securitization, with all the tranching of CDOs and leverage
created a bubble and the introduction of CDS burst it, pushing pricing faster and
further down than they would have gone had there never been tranching or leverage
or CDS. Had CDS been there from the beginning, asset prices would never have
gotten so high.
The most dramatic drop in price occurs with the historical timing. In Figure 15
we see the evolution of the risky asset price assuming that the economy that starts
at t = 0 with no leverage. At t = 1 leverage is unexpectedly introduced and price
goes up, even though some bad news arrives. In t = 2 the risky asset tranching
technology is unexpectedly introduced and the price climbs even further, despite
more bad news. Finally, at t = 3 CDS are unexpectedly introduced and with it the
price crashes. Just one piece of bad news, on top of the introduction of CDS, reduces
the price by nearly 50%. In our dynamic model we only keep track of price after bad
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Figure 15: Anatomy of the Bubble and Crash.
news, yet the introduction of leverage and tranching is still strong enough to oﬀset
the bad news and raise prices. Obviously in reality, the leverage and tranching part
of the cycle occurred mostly during pieces of “good news,” which made the bubble
even more violent.
It would be very interesting to endogenize the order of ﬁnancial innovation. We
conjecture that with a transactions cost, CDS would not be traded at the beginning
because there is a very small probability of paying oﬀ. As the likelihood increases and
more disagreement is created, more people will want to trade them. This common
sense thought does not really obtain in our model, as far as we can see, because in
the model agents who are going to be the most pessimistic at the end are already
the most pessimistic at the beginning. They would buy their CDS from the start
if there were no transactions costs. Indeed CDS volume would decline, not increase
over time. Clearly this merits more investigation.

38

6

References
• Acharya and Viswanathan. 2011. “Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity.”
Journal of Finance, 66, 2011, 99-138.
• Adrian T. and Shin H. 2010. “Liquidity and Leverage”. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 19 (3), 418-437, 2010.
• Araujo A., Kubler F. and Schommer S. 2011.“Regulating Collateral-Requirements
when Markets are Incomplete.” 2009. Forthcoming Journal of Economic Theory.
• Brunnermeier M. 2009. “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 20072009”. Journal of Economics Perspective, 23(1), 77-100.
• Brunnermeier M. and Pedersen L. 2009. “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity.” Review of Financial Studies, vol 22,6,2201-2238.
• Bolton P. and Oehmke M. 2011. “Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem”. Forthcoming Review of Financial Studies.
• Cao D. 2010. “Collateral Shortages, Asset Price and Investment Volatility with
Heterogenous Beliefs”. MIT job market paper.
• Che Y. and Sethi R. 2010. “Credit Derivatives and the Cost of Capital.”
Manuscript.
• Fostel A. and Geanakoplos J. 2008. “Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy” American Economic Review 2008, 98:4, 1211-1244.
• Fostel A. and Geanakoplos J. 2010. “Why Does Bad News Increase Volatility
and Decrease Leverage”. Forthcoming Journal of Economic Theory.
• Fostel A. and Geanakoplos J. 2011. “Endogenous Leverage: VaR and Beyond”.
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper.
• Garleanu N. and Pedersen L. 2011. “Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price”. Review of Financial Studies, vol. 24 (2011),
no. 6, pp. 1980-2022.
• Geanakoplos J. 1997. “Promises, Promises.” In The Economy as an Evolving
Complex System II, ed. W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf, and David Lane,
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A
A.1

Two more CDS Economies
CDS without Tranching

For many assets, like sovereign bonds nowadays, direct tranching is not available but
CDS are written. As we said earlier, if the asset itself can be used as collateral by
the writer of CDS insurance, then indeed the assets are indirectly tranched, and the
analysis of the last section applies. There is good reason why the asset might be used
as collateral for its own insurance (puzzling as that sounds), because the optimists
most likely to own the bonds will be the same people writing the insurance. But
in practice cash seems to be the collateral of choice, so for completeness we analyze
also the case where only cash can be used as collateral for the CDS. We also do not
permit leverage of the assets. In the next section we do.
To formalize our assumption that there is no tranching and that CDS must be
collateralized with cash, we take J = J X to consist of just the CDS c that promises
(0, 1). In equilibrium there will be two marginal buyers h1 > h2 . Agents h > h1 will
hold all of the “cash” X and use it all as collateral to write CDS c on Y , hence
eﬀectively holding only the Arrow U security. Agents h2 < h < h1 will sell all their
endowment of X and purchase all of the asset Y . Finally, agents h < h2 will sell
their assets Y and X and buy the CDS from the most optimistic investors.
Equation (17) says that the top group of agents indeed holds all of X, and writes
the maximal number of CDS.
(1 − h1 )(1 + p) + πc = 1

(17)

Note that these agents are eﬀectively buying the Arrow Up security at an implicit
price of pU = 1 − πc . Equation (18) says that the bottom group of agents holds all
the CDS
h2 (1 + p) = πc

(18)

Equation (19) says that h1 is indiﬀerent between writing CDS backed by X (and
thus synthetically holding the Arrow Up security) and holding the asset
qUh1
q h1 + (1 − qUh1 )R
= U
1 − πc
p
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(19)

Equation (20) says that h2 is indiﬀerent between holding the asset and holding
the CDS c
qUh2 + (1 − qUh2 )R
1 − qUh2
=
p
πc

(20)

For the probabilities qUh = (1 − h)2 and R = .2, we get h1 = .65, h2 = .29, p = .55
and πc = .36. The implicit arrow prices are given by pU = .63 and pD = .45.

A.2

CDS with Leverage

Finally we add the possibility of leverage for Y, maintaining the hypothesis that Y
cannot be tranched and that only X can be used as collateral for CDS. To formalize
this assumption, we take J X to consist of just the CDS c that promises (0, 1), and
we take J Y to be all promises of the form (j, j) for any j > 0. As we saw before only
the promise (j ∗ , j ∗ ) = (R, R) will be traded in equilibrium. We denote its price by
πj ∗ .
In equilibrium there will as usual be two marginal buyers h1 > h2 . Agents h > h1
will hold all of Y, purchased entirely via leverage, and all of the cash X, using it
all as collateral to write CDS c on Y , hence eﬀectively holding only the Arrow U
security. Agents h2 < h < h1 will sell all their endowment of X and Y and lend it to
the optimists, protected by the collateral of Y . Finally, agents h < h2 will sell their
assets Y and X and buy the CDS from the most optimistic investors.
Equation (21) says that the top group of agents indeed holds all of Y via leverage
and also all of X, and writes the maximal number of CDS.
(1 − h1 )(1 + p) + πc + πj ∗ = 1 + p

(21)

Note that these agents are eﬀectively buying the Arrow Up security at an implicit
price of pU = 1 − πc . But they are equally buying all the Arrow Up security via their
leveraged purchase of Y. Hence Equation (22) requires that
1
1−R
=
p − πj ∗
1 − πc

(22)

Equation (23) says that the bottom group of agents holds all the CDS
h2 (1 + p) = πc
42

(23)

Equation (24) says that h1 is indiﬀerent between writing CDS backed by X (and
thus synthetically holding the Arrow Up security) and lending
qUh1
R
=
1 − πc
πj ∗

(24)

Equation (25) says that h2 is indiﬀerent between lending and holding the CDS c
R
1 − qUh2
=
πj ∗
πc

(25)

For the probabilities qUh = (1 − h)2 and R = .2, we get h1 = .38, h2 = .28, p =
.61, πc = .45 and πj ∗ = .17. The implicit arrow prices are given by by pU = .54 and
pD = .56.
Figure 16 presents asset prices values for diﬀerent values of R as we did in the
main text but for the six diﬀerent cases.
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Figure 16: Asset Prices in all economies for diﬀerent values of R.
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B

Equilibrium Equations for diﬀerent Economies
in Section 5
1. CDS and Tranching Economy.
As noted before, this equilibrium corresponds to the Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium. The equations are the traditional equations in which we solve for arrowprices for N + 1 ﬁnal states.
2. No-Leverage Economy.
We use the fact that the marginal buyer rolls over his debt at every node to
build up the system and then verify that the guess is correct. Notice that the
probability of good news in period k is given by (1 − (1 − hk )2 )1/N .
p1 = ((1 − (1 − hk )2 )1/N )N + (1 − ((1 − (1 − hk )2 )1/N )N )R
p1 =

(1 − h1 ) + R
h1
..
.

pk = ((1 − (1 − hk )2 )1/N )N −k + (1 − ((1 − (1 − hk )2 )1/N )N −k )R
..
.

pN −1 = ((1 − (1 − hN −1 )2 )1/N )N −(N −1) + (1 − ((1 − (1 − hN −1 )2 )1/N )N −(N −1) )R
3. Leverage Economy.
Notice that since the ﬁnal probability of disaster is constant (regardless of N ),
the probability of bad news in period k is given by (1 − hk )2/k . What is crucial
is that the marginal buyers are decreasing in time. There is a perpetual wealth
redistribution towards more pessimistic investors in each period after bad news
since previous leveraged investors go bankrupt.
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pN +1 = R
pN = (1 − (1 − hN )2/N ) + (1 − hN )2/N R
hN −1 =

hN (1 + pN )
1 + pN +1
2/N

pN −1 =

)
N −1 )
p
(1 − (1 − hN −1 )2/N ) + (1 − hN −1 )2/N (1−(1−h
(1−(1−hN )2/N ) N
2/N

)
N −1 )
(1 − (1 − hN −1 )2/N ) + (1 − hN −1 )2/N (1−(1−h
(1−(1−hN )2/N )

hN −2 =

hN −1 (1 + pN −1 )
1 + pN
..
.
2/N

p1 =

)
1)
p
(1 − (1 − h1 )2/N ) + (1 − h1 )2/N (1−(1−h
(1−(1−h2 )2/N ) 2
2/N

)
(1−(1−h1 )
(1 − (1 − h1 )2/N ) + (1 − h1 )2/N (1−(1−h
2/N )
2)

h0 =

h1 (1 + p1 )
=1
1 + p2

4. Tranching Economy
The probabilities are as before. The equilibrium in this economy is more challenging due to the multiplicity of marginal buyers in each period. It turns
out that both marginal buyers are decreasing with time. Buyers of Arrow U
security last only for one period. The second marginal buyer wealth evolution
turns out to be more complicated. They buy gold in the future, but eventually,
as time goes by, they buy Arrow U. In our example for N=10, h02 buys gold
from t = 1 to t = 8, and buys Arrow U in the last trading period. Deﬁne
h
= 1 − qUh .
qUh = (1 − (1 − h)( 2/N )) and qD
At t = 0
p0 − p1 pD1 = (1 − h10 )(1 + p0 )
h20 (1 + p0 ) = p1 pD1
45

h1

h1

qU0
qU0
h1
h1
= qU0 + qD0
p0 − p1 pD1
p1 − p2 pD2
h2

qD0
h2
h2
C0 = qU0 + qD0 C0
pD1
where pD1 is the price of the Arrow down (which pays in period 1 after bad
news) and C0 is the continuation value of h20 given his future investment
For t = k for k = 2, ..., N − 2.
h1k−1 − h1k
h1k−1 − h2k−1

pk − pk+1 pDk+1 =

h2k
pk = pk+1 pDk+1
h2k−1
h1

h1

qUk
qUk
h1
h1
= qUk + qDk
pk − pk+1 pDk+1
pk+1 − pk+2 pDd+2
h2

qDk
pDk+1

h2

h2

Ck = qUk + qDk Ck

At t = N − 1
pN −1 − pN pDN =

h1N −2 − h1N −1
h1N −2 − h2N −2

h2N −1
pN −1 = pN pDN
h2N −2
h1

qUN −1
=1
pN −1 − RpDN
h2

qDN −1
=1
pDN

C

Equilibrium Values in Section 4 and 5

Table 1 and 2 show the complete equilibrium information from Section 4 and 5
respectively.
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